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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
JACK. F. SCHERBEL : 
Plaintiff-Appellant : Case No. 19633 
vs. : 
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION 
ET AL. 
Defendant-Respondents : 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff-Appellant appeals the judgment of the Third 
Judicial Court of the State of Utah, dated October 25, 1983, de-
nying plaintiff any relief and dismissing the plaintifffs com-
plaint. 
DISPOSITION OF THE LOWER COURT 
The Lower Court denied Plaintiff's request for relief, 
ruled that the decision of the Salt Lake City Council was not 
arbitrary or capricious nor did it exceed the Council's authori-
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ty; that the terms and provisions of Section 51-32-8 (3) of the 
Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City, relating to visual compata-
bility were not unconstitutionally vague; that Section 51-14A-1 
of the Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City were not invalid nor 
unconstitutional; that the action of the City Council in City Or-
dinance No. 10 of 1980, downzoning the area of Plaintifffs pro-
posed construction to a residential "R-2H" classification was not 
invalid; and that Plaintiff was not entitled to build his pro-
posed construction project and had no vested right to do so. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff-appellant seeks to have the Judgment of the 
Lower Court reversed and set aside and a ruling by this Honorable 
Court that Plaintiff-appellant had acquired a vested right to 
construct his proposed project as approved by the Planning and 
Zoning Commission of Salt Lake City Corporation (Plaintiff's Ex-
hibit No. 39) that the "appeal" to the City Council was invalid 
and that the remedy of a proper "agrieved" party was to ask for a 
review of the ruling of the Planning and Zoning Commission by the 
District Court which could only rule on the question of whether 
or not the said commission had acted arbitrarily and capriciously 
and contrary to law in approving the application of Plaintiff-
appellant. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff-appellant is the owner of real property on 
the southeast corner of Second Avenue and "E" Street in Salt Lake 
City, Utah, which property has been in the family for approxi-
mately 80 years (with an option to purchase an adjoining piece of 
property), comprising approximately 1/2 acre. As early as May of 
1973, Plaintiff-appellant began petitioning Salt Lake City for ap-
proval to construct a multiple housing unit on his property at 
above location and continued each year thereafter to propose to 
the City Planning and Zoning Commission various plans for the 
construction of multiple housing units on his said property (De-
fendants' Exhibits 28, 29, 30, 31 and 32). 
In the time period, related above, the City established 
an Historic District in the City's avenue area and required sub-
mission of any proposed new construction to the Historic Landmark 
Committee for its study and recommendation after an application 
had been filed with the Planning and Zoning Commission for new 
construction. The Planning and Zoning Commission, however, was 
not required to follow the recommendation of the Historic 
Landmark Committee and could approve an application regardless of 
said committee's recommendation to the contrary. 
Plaintiff-appellant filed an application for a building 
permit, dated June 19, 1977, for construction of a nursing home 
and rehabilitation center (Defendants1 Exhibit 33). Due to prob-
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lems encountered, this application was abandoned and Plaintiff-
appellant on October 24, 1979f filed a new application for a 
building permit to construct a 35 unit condominium project on his 
said property (Plaintiff's Exhibit 2 and Exhibit 3). 
At about the same time, the Greater Avenues Community 
Council, hereinafter referred to as GACC, filed petition No, 579 
with the City, requesting downzoning of an area in the avenues 
which encompassed the property of Plaintiff-appellant (Defen-
dant's Exhibit 34) . 
On November 6, 1979, the Historical Landmark Committee 
met to discuss and study the application of Plaintiff-appellant. 
This committee voted to recommend against its approval, objecting 
to the density and height of the proposed construction (Plain-
tiff's Exhibit 2-P — see also Plaintiff's Exhibit 4-P). 
On January 10, 1980, the Planning and Zoning Commis-
sion, at the request of the Plaintiff-appellant, considered the 
application of Mr. Scherbel and, even though the Historical 
Landmark Committee had recommended against the proposed project, 
in a five to three vote the Planning and Zoning Commission ap-
proved the proposed plans (Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 39) as being 
"compatible with the neighborhood" and then "ORDERED that the re-
quest for a permit to build a 35 unit condominium project on the 
southeast corner of "E" Street and Second Avenue within a His-
toric District BE GRANTED and the Building Inspector be 
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authorized to issue the required permitsn (Plaintiff's Exhibit 3-
P and 4-P). 
Immediately thereafter (on the same day, in fact, that 
the Planning and Zoning Commission had approved the Plaintiff's 
application to construct the 35 unit condominium as shown on 
Plaintiff's submitted plans [Plaintifffs Exhibit No. 39]), the 
said Greater Avenues Community Council (GACC), an ad hoc organi-
zation of citizens, wrote a letter to Mayor Ted Wilson, purpor-
ting to "appeal" to a "higher authority" the decision of the 
Planning and Zoning Commission (Plaintiff's Exhibit 6-P). 
On February 19, 1980, Mayor Ted Wilson issued Executive 
Order No. 2^ purporting to grant the "appeal" of the GACC by pur-
porting also to grant to the City Council (a legislative body of 
the council form of government) authority to hear the "appeal." 
The directive purported to grant to this legislative body the 
following authority: "Said Council after a review of the testi-
mony presented before it by a vote of at least four members of 
said council, may affirm, reverse or modify the decision of the 
Planning Commission." 
Almost simultaneously with the issuance of Executive 
Order No. 2 by Mayor Wilson (the same day) the hearing took 
place, beginning on February 19th and continuing to February 20th 
of 1980 (Defendants' Exhibit 24-D). 
The "appeal" was heard, over the objections of the 
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Plaintiff-appellant by the entire City Council, the legislative 
branch of city government, in the form of a Hde novo" proceeding 
and the "agrieved parties" who requested the hearing were 
referred to as Mr. Justin Stewart and the GACC. There is no re-
cord that any sworn testimony was, in fact, presented with cross-
examination of any witnesses. The Findings of Fact and Conclu-
sions of Law and Order, reversing the Planning and Zoning Commis-
sion's approval of Plaintiff's proposed project were signed and 
entered on the 11th day of March 1980 (Plaintiff's Exhibit 13- P 
and 15-P and Defendants' Exhibit 24-D). 
To further frustrate Plaintiff's attempts to improve 
his property, the area in which Plaintiff's property is situated 
was downzoned from an R-6 to an R-2H classification on January 
29, 1980 (Plaintiff's Exhibits 9-P, 10-P, 11-P). 
Thereafter Plaintiff filed his action in the District 
Court of Salt Lake County, which Court rendered a decision de-
nying him relief and upholding the procedures of allowing the Ci-
ty Council to hear de novo the matter of approval of Plaintiff's 
proposed plans (Plaintiff's Exhibit 39) and further upholding the 
procedure of allowing the political decision of the legislative 
body of the city to be substituted for the expert judgment of the 
Planning and Zoning Commission. 
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POINT I 
PLAINTIFF HAS A VESTED RIGHT TO PROCEED 
WITH THE BUILDING PROJECT AS APPROVED 
BY THE PLANNING AND ZONING COMMISSION 
The creation of the Historical Landmark Committee, an 
ad hoc organization and its function, seems to have caused some 
confusion in the minds of some of the city officials. His-
torically, the Planning and Zoning Commission has been composed 
of well-informed persons carefully chosen, whose duty it is to 
carefully scrutinize all proposed construction plans prepared in 
sufficient detail and to scale, showing the actual dimensions of 
the lot to be built upon, the size and location of buildings to 
be erected, showing elevations, set-backs, etc. to determine that 
the plans meet all requirements as to zoning. Well-meaning citi-
zens in their efforts to preserve for future posterity those 
structures deemed by them to be of historical value, have 
attempted to superimpose upon the Planning and Zoning Commission, 
an advisory committee which in Salt Lake City is known as the 
Historical Landmarks Committees (HLC). Actually, the HLC is no 
more than an advisory group which the Planning and Zoning Commis-
sion may or may not heed. 
Certainly, it was never intended that the recommenda-
tion of HLC was a mandate to the Planning and Zoning Commission, 
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although in the instant case little consideration, by either the 
lower court or the city fathers, was given to the fact that the 
Planning and Zoning Commission is the appointed body of the city 
to carefully study an application to construct a new building or 
buildings and after careful consideration to either approve or 
deny the application. The only limitation on the power and 
authority of the Planning and Zoning Commission in an Historic 
Landmark area is that the application cannot be approved until 
the HLC has also studied the application and taken a position of 
either recommending approval or denial. 
The recommended denial, however, seems in the instant 
case to have been interpreted to mean that the Planning and Zo-
ning Commission acted contrary to law when it gave its approval 
to the Scherbel application and that some action had to be taken 
to whip this Commission into paying absolute attention to the 
HLC's recommendation, as though it were a mandate. 
The language of Sec. 51-32-6, Revised Ordinances of 
Salt Lake City, specifically grants to the Planning and Zoning 
Commission "power to approve or deny issuing [a building] per-
mit." It was pursuant to this ordinance that Plaintiff-appellant 
on October 24, 1979, submitted his application to the Planning 
and Zoning Commission for a building permit to allow construction 
of his proposed project. 
Section 51-32-7, Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City 
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states: 
Planning shall approve or deny such an application 
within five months of receipt of the application. If 
Planning approves the application, the application 
shall be processed in the same manner as all other ap-
plications for building or demolition permits. If the 
committee disapproves the application, the commmittee 
shall state its reasons in writing and a permit shall 
not be issued at that time. The foregoing to the con-
trary, notwithstanding unless the owner of the property 
agrees to an extension of time beyond said five months 
or unless means acceptable to the owner have been found 
to preserve the structure, or eminent domain pro-
ceedings have commenced, Planning shall, upon the pas-
sage of five months from the date of application pro-
vided the work proposed to be done meets all other re-
quirements of city and state law for issuance of such a 
permit. 
After the approval by the Planning and Zoning Commis-
sion the various permits necessary for the project's execution, 
such as demolition permit, building permit after final detailed 
architectural plans had been prepared were purely ministerial 
and, but for the so-called appeal and subsequent unlawful inter-
vening action of the legislative body of the city government, 
there would have been no problem. 
If, therefore, this court rules that the action of the 
City Council was ultra vires under the city's strong mayor-coun-
cil form of government and allows the decision of the Planning 
and Zoning Commission to stand, it follows that the City must is-
sue the building permits or proceed under eminent domain to ac-
quire the property and pay Mr. Scherbel its fair market value. 
This court a few years ago had cause to study carefully 
-9-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the separation of powers under the mayor-council form of 
government in the case of Martindale, et al. vs. Anderson, et al. 
581 P2 1022. This Court ruled in that case that the Utah Legis-
lature provided "for a complete separation of executive and 
legislative powers, the former being lodged exclusively in the 
mayor and the latter in the council." This Court went on to 
state that this is so because the Act is patterned after the ab-
solute separation of powers doctrine set forth in the federal and 
state constitutions." This Court went on further (p. 1027) to 
state: 
On the other hand, we cannot agree with the 
conclusion that the executive powers of the 
minicipality are to be in some way shared. 
When the Act is read in its entirety, and each 
provision thereof is read in context with all the 
others, and when viewed in the light of the legislative 
history of municipal government in Utah, we are com-
pelled to conclude that it in fact provides for the ab-
solute separtion of executive and legislative powers 
(emphasis added). 
There can be no doubt but that the Planning and Zoning 
Commission exercises an executive function of city government and 
that the City Council is strictly the legislative body of the ci-
ty. How, then, can the separation of powers be carried out if 
the Mayor can by an Executive Order delegate to the legislative 
body a function which is in no way a legislative one? If the 
City needs to clarify an ambiguity or anachronism in its ordinan-
ces, relating to the proper procedures to be followed to over-
rule or set aside the decision of the Planning and Zoning 
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Commission, it should do so in the proper manner, namely by means 
of the City Council enacting a proper ordinance to set forth the 
procedures to be followed, either by means of appeal to an admi-
nistrative appellate body or to a court of law. To allow the 
Mayor to delegate to the legislative body what is either an 
executive (administrative) appeal or a judicial appeal defeats 
the very purpose of the Act and would thereby frustrate the Leg-
islative intent in providing for an absolute separation of execu-
tive and legislative powers. 
In view of the foregoing statements of the law it was 
error for the lower court to ignore this Court's ruling in the 
Martindale Case (supra) and, by denying the Plaintiff the relief 
requested, thereby approve the action of the Mayor and the City 
Council. 
At no time did the Planning and Zoning Commission dis-
approve the application unless the "order" of the City Council 
could be deemed such disapproval, which in light of the Martin-
dale case (supra) it could not; it, therefore, follows that pur-
suant to the provisions of Sec 51-32-7, Revised Ordinances of 
Salt Lake City (supra), the Plaintiff-appellant was entitled to 
the issuance of the building permit as of March 24, 1980 (five 
months after the application was filed). 
This case is not entirely unique in the methods used to 
block and frustrate the Plaintiff-appellant. In the case of 
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Smith vs M. Spiegel and Sons Oil Corporation, Inc., 31 A.D. 2nd 
d 
819, 298 N.Y.S.2 47 (1969) affirmed 24 NYS 2d984 (1969), Smith 
applied for a building permit in October of 1967 to construct a 
service station. Later that month, neighborhood civic organiza-
tions and other residents initiated legal action to prohibit the 
issuance of the permit. While the legal action was pending the 
city rezoned the area so that service stations were prohibited. 
In discussing whether the applicant had a vested right to the 
building permit, the court stated: 
The are two rules to be applied in determining 
whether a party has acquired vested rights to a buil-
ding permit prior* to a zoning resolution amendment 
which would prohibit such use. The first, which ap-
plies where no permit has been issued, is that the par-
ty is entitled to the permit when the public officials 
in question willfully withhold and refuse to issue the 
permit and, in addition, mislead and hinder him, to the 
end that if they had acted with reasonable promptness 
his permit would have been granted and he could have 
conducted the business in question and thereby have ac-
quired a vested right prior to the zoning amendment. 
The second, which applies where a permit has been is-
sued, is that vested rights are acquired where the 
property owner has commenced work of a substantial 
character on the property prior to the amendment. 298 
N.Y.S. 2d at 49 [Citations omitted; emphasis added]. 
This rule was recently applied in Pcirkridge vs. City of 
Seattle, 89 Wash. 2nd 454, 573 P.2d 359 (1978), a case remarkably 
similar to the instant case. In 1966 and 1967, Parkridge pur-
chased certain lots for the purpose of constructing apartments. 
In 1973, when they applied for a demolition permit, someone in 
the city's Building Department notified a community council of 
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the demolition application. This group thereupon contacted the 
superintendant of the Building Department demanding that the en-
vironmental impact statement be required before the issuance of a 
permit. The city complied. Within a month, the group filed a 
petition to re-zone the area in which the Parkridge lots were lo-
cated so that apartments could not be built. Subsequently, 
Parkridge applied for a building permit to construct a 60 unit 
apartment. The city then re-zoned the area as petitioned. 
Meanwhile, the Building Department required Parkridge 
to provide a complete environmental asssessment report on the 
proposed building project and sent Parkridge a form letter noti-
fying them that no action would be taken on their building appli-
cation for six months. In response, Parkridge1s architect began 
meeting with a representative of the Building Department. As a 
result of those discussions, Parkridge modified its plans by re-
ducing its building from 60 to 50 units. The architect continued 
to meet with Building Department and Traffic Engineer personnel. 
After about six months, the Building Department informed 
Parkrdige that under the Building Code, the time for acting on 
its application had expired and in January 1975, informed Park-
ridge that no further action of the building permit would be 
taken. Thereupon, Parkridge filed a lawsuit, demanding the is-
suance of a building permit. The trial court determined that 
Parkridge had a vested right to a building permit. 
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In dealing with the vested rights claim of Parkridge, 
the Washington Supreme Court agreed that Parkridge was diligent 
in its efforts to obtain a building permit and that Parkridge was 
frustrated by the City's actions. On this basis, the trial 
court's decision that Parkridge had a vested right to the permit 
was affirmed. 
In the Parkridge case (supra) it was argued that the 
applicant could not have acquired a vested right since he did not 
ever submit final plans. The court ruled that this was not 
necessary. In the instant case it would have availed Mr. Scher-
bel nothing. The City Council, by its ultra vires act had or-
dered that no permit be issued and that the Building Department 
refused to issue any permit without a directive from the Planning 
and Zoning Commission and that body, although it had previously 
approved the application, after the political machinations of the 
City Council, it took no further action. Performance of a use-
less act was not required with its attendant architectural ex-
pense. 
POINT II 
THE CITY COUNCIL HAD NO AUTHORITY TO HEAR 
THE GREATER AVENUE COMMUNITY COUNCIL APPEAL 
The day after the Planning and Zoning Commission 
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authorized the Building Inspector to issue the required permits, 
the Greater Avenues Community Council appealed the decision to 
"the higher authority" by addressing a letter to Mayor Wilson. 
On February 20, 1980, the City Council heard the appeal, reversed 
the Planning and Zoning Commission's decision and ordered that no 
building permits be issued. 
The City Council's claimed authority to hear the appeal 
was based upon Section 51-32-11, Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake 
City, and/or Executive Order No. 2 (February 19, 1980). The 
Ordinance and/or Executive Order could not give the City Council 
authority to hear the appeal. 
Section 51-32-11, Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City 
provided that "any decision of Planning may [be] appeal[ed] to 
the Board of City Commissioners." At the time the appeal was 
made, the Board of City Commissioners had been dissolved. Since 
authority for any appeal must be based upon a statute or 
ordinance, and since Section 51-32-11 was not amended to give the 
City Council authority to hear an appeal, the City Council had 
no authority to hear it under this provision. 
The underlying principle here is illustrated by the 
procedure used to replace the City Courts with Circuit Courts in 
1978. When the State Legislature abolished the City Courts, it 
recognized that those matters over which the City Courts had 
jurisdiction would not automatically be within the jurisdiction 
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of the new circuit Courts. For this reason, Utah Code Annotated 
Section 78-4-32 was enacted giving the Circuit Courts jurisdic-
tion over matters which would otherwise be lost when the City 
Courts were dissolved. If the City Council was to have the jur-
isdiction of the Board of City Commissioners, an ordinance to 
that effect should have been enacted. Because of the fundamental 
change in the organization of the City's government, however, it 
is obvious why it was not possible for such ordinances to be 
enacted. 
Standing alone, the Executive Order conferring 
authority upon the City Council to hear the appeal is an ex post 
facto creation of a right of appeal in derogation of Mr. Scher-
bel ' s rights and is therefore void. In addition, the Mayor had 
no authority to create such an appeal. 
Furthermore, the City Council ordered that no building 
permits be issued. As stated in Section 10-3-1217, the City 
Council "shall not give orders" to any subordinate of the Mayor. 
The permit office is subordinate to the Mayor. Applying the 
statute literally, each council member concurring in the order 
may be required to forfeit his or her office. 
In light of the above, the appeal to the City Council 
was improper. By granting the appeal and deciding adversely to 
Mr. Scherbel, the City has prevented Mr. Scherbel from obtaining 
his building permit. 
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POINT III 
THE GREATER AVENUES COMMUNITY COUNCIL, 
A SPECIAL INTEREST GROUP, DID NOT 
HAVE STANDING TO "APPEAL" 
The ordinance on which the Mayor and the Council relied in 
"granting the appeal" of the GACC states: "Any person agrieved by 
any decision of planning may appeal that decision to the Board of 
Commissioners". Section 51-32-11, Revised Ordinances of Salt 
Lake City. An "agrieved person," according to Black, is "one who 
has suffered a denial of some personal or property right." The 
grievance must be based on some direct and tangible personal or 
property right which is adversely affected. There was no showing 
that GACC had any grievance, except that those who composed the 
group politically took exception to the ruling of the Planning 
and Zoning Commission and induced the Mayor to refer the "appeal" 
to the City Council for a political decision harmonious with 
their ideas of what should and what should not be built in the 
general area of the avenues of Salt Lake City. Certainly, if 
GACC was qualified as an "agrieved person," it is respectfully 
submitted that city government could not function as a result of 
the political interferences (appeals) of special interest groups 
from decisions of the city's various executive bodies, boards and 
commissions. 
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POINT IV 
THE FINDINGS OF COURT AS TO THE SUFFICIENCY 
OF PLANS FOR PLANNING AND ZONING REVIEW 
IS CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 39-P, introduced and accepted as 
evidence, clearly speaks for itself. It is a detailed plan, 
showing the property to be improved and the set-back, elevations 
and all other details required to be set forth in order to obtain 
a building permit. To rule to the contrary would be tantamount 
to saying that the Planning and Zoning Commission was incompetent 
and incapable of knowing what were and what were not plans suffi-
cient in detail to obtain the initial necessary green light for 
the proposed project. It is common knowledge that a developer 
does not spend large sums of money on the final and complete ar-
chitectural plans prior to getting threshold approval for the 
project from the Planning and Zoning authority. Nowhere does the 
lower court find that the commission was incompetent, but by 
stating in the Findings of Fact No. 37 (p. 9) that the 
"preliminary plans lacked the detail required to complete a re-
quired review for zoning compliance" where such plans had, in 
fact, been submitted, reviewed by the Commission and approved 
over the objection of the HLC, the message could not be clearer. 
The fact is, the preliminary plans (Plaintiff's Exhibit 39) were 
in sufficient detail and it was error for the lower court to sub-
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stitute its judgment for that of the experts sitting on the Com-
mission. 
CONCLUSION 
The approval by the Salt Lake City Planning and Zoning Com-
mission of the plans submitted by the Plaintiff-appellant gave a 
vested right to a building permit to improve the property on the 
Southeast corner of Second Avenue and "E" Street as set forth in 
the plans (Plaintiff's Exhibit 39) and the lower court erred in 
denying to Plaintiff-appellant the relief prayed for in his com-
plaint. This court, therefore, should on the basis of the record 
and the law, set aside the ruling of the lower court and remand 
the case with instructions to the lower court to require the city 
to forthwith issue the building permit as approved by the City 
Planning and Zoning Commission on January 10, 1980. 
Dated this /^P^Z of June, 1984. 
RespeCT^ully submitted, 
I^EON A. HALGREI^ 
>rney for Che Plaintiff-
appellant 
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